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In mid-May 1997, the United States In-
ternational trade Commission (USITC)
held public hearings as part of its in-
vestigation into the economic effects
of the North American Free Agree-
ment (NAFTA) over the course of its
first three years. The investigation,
The Impact of the North American Free
Trade Agreement on the U.S. Economy
and Industries: A Three Year Review, was
requested by the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR)
as an outgrowth of the still unsettled
debate over the benefits and costs of
pursuing a free trade agreement with
a developing country.1 Section 512 of
the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment Implementation Act requires
President Clinton to report to Con-
gress on the operation and effects of
NAFTA in the agreement’s first three
years. The USITC’s report, released
in June 1997, was the main source for
the Administration’s final report to
Congress, released by the USTR on
July 11, 1997.2 The NAFTA debate
and the recent USITC and USTR in-
quiries have led economists to think
carefully about how to measure the
economic benefits of free trade agree-
ments. This Chicago Fed Letter reviews
economists’ long-established ways
of evaluating the gains from trade
liberalization and introduces some
more recent innovations in the con-
text of NAFTA.
“Trade policy” analysis can be classified
as either short-run or long-run. Short-
run analysis focuses on the transition
period following the implementation
of a new trade policy, in which factors
of production, especially workers,
are relocated across industries and
countries, and new investment in
productive capital is undertaken.
In contrast, long-run analysis ignores
the transition period from the old
restricted trade environment to the
new liberalized environment and
studies the economy once the realloca-
tion of factors and new capital invest-
ment are completed. Until recently, all
trade liberalization analysis was of the
long-run variety.
In 1817, David Ricardo performed
long-run analysis of the UK “corn laws,”
which were a form of import restriction
on agricultural imports. Ricardo was
concerned that these import restric-
tions would hinder the UK’s ability to
grow. In particular, he analyzed the
impact of the UK’s corn laws on trade
between the then less-developed, land-
rich, Baltic countries and the more
industrialized United Kingdom. This
is typically referred to as North-South
trade analysis, that is, trade between
industrial (northern) and developing
(southern) economies. Ricardo suc-
cessfully argued against the laws (they
were later repealed). The exercise
may seem distant to us because it was
conducted over 150 years ago, but it
remains very relevant to the NAFTA
debate. Much like NAFTA, it involved
trade liberalization between countries
at very different stages of development.
In this regard, Ricardo’s analysis estab-
lished an analytical framework that is
still useful today.
The centerpiece of Ricardo’s analytical
framework was a mathematical model
of international trade that shed light
on the likely impact of trade restric-
tions. He was able to show that the
corn laws had a negative impact on
the UK economy, much akin to the
effects that today’s trade restrictions
have on national economies.
Ricardo’s analysis was instrumental
in establishing the field of interna-
tional trade and developing the basic
tools of trade analysis. Through his
work and the work of others, we under-
stand that the value of international
trade lies in its ability to expand eco-
nomic opportunities. In the 1930s,
Paul Samuelson added to this body
of work by showing that, if a country
chooses to engage in trade, then trade
must lead to an unambiguous improve-
ment in aggregate well-being of that
country. However, Samuelson’s “gains
from trade theorem” is an aggregate
result, which leaves open the possibility
that while trade makes the country bet-
ter off, it may make some individual(s)
in the country worse off. What is true
about Samuelson’s result is that a
country is deemed to be better off
because the gains from trade are
such that those who are made better
off are able to compensate those who
are made worse off and still have some
of the gain left over. This is the sense
in which trade improves the aggregate
well-being of a country.
Another qualification is that policy-
makers are rarely faced with the choice
between switching their country from
no trade to trade (or vice versa). They
must deal with moving from one re-
stricted trade setting to a possibly less
restricted trade setting. For example,
the pre-NAFTA environment was more
restricted than the post-NAFTA envi-
ronment. NAFTA is still a restricted
trade environment because Canada,
Mexico, and the U.S. still have in place
trade barriers to countries outside
North America. The improvements
in a country’s well-being are even
more ambiguous in such instances.
One of the more frustrating results in
the theoretical trade literature is that
moving from a restricted setting to
either a less-restricted or free-trade
setting may in fact make one of the
liberalizing countries worse off. Only
an open economy that is so small
it cannot influence world commodity
prices has been shown unambigu-
ously to be better off following uni-
lateral liberalization.Overcoming the shortcomings
of existing models
Ambiguous theoretical results on the
effects of trade liberalization, along
with technological developments in
computer hardware and software and
advances in theoretical economic
analysis, have stimulated quantitative
work that measures the international,
macroeconomic, and microeconomic
impact of trade policies. The dominant
approach uses detailed simulation
models with many households and
firms to measure how different indus-
tries, household income groups, and
countries are affected by changes in
trade policy. In much the same vein
as Ricardo’s analysis of the corn laws,
this approach employs models that
are designed to tell us something
about the long-run impact of a trade
policy change. These models ignore
any transitional effects associated
with the change in trade policy and
are generally referred to as static
trade models.
Although widely used, static models
have a number of shortcomings, which
in the aggregate understate the bene-
fits of trade liberalization and over-
state the sectoral or individual costs
of trade liberalization. This has encour-
aged the development of quantitative
dynamic models that tell us something
about both the short- and long-run
effects of trade policy. Dynamic models
are more realistic than static models
in three important ways. First, static
models limit the world supply of phys-
ical capital to that available in the
pre-liberalization period. Therefore
improvements in economic well-being
and output gains associated with trade
liberalization come from the realloca-
tion of physical capital across sectors
and countries in a static model. A re-
allocation of factors will mean that
some sectors must contract as others
expand. Static models ignore the fact
that physical capital accumulation is
easier under free trade and therefore
understate the potential output gains
that accrue from liberalization. In a
dynamic model, production gains flow
from greater investment in physical
capital and a reallocation of factors
across sectors and countries.
Second, traditional static trade models
neglect trade in financial assets by
restricting trade balances to zero.
International capital flows allow house-
holds to maintain consumption levels
while undertaking major physical
capital investment. In the absence of
international trade in financial assets,
households are less likely to undertake
large and rapid capital investment.
Therefore, static models tend to
underestimate the improvement in
economic well-being that flows from
trade liberalization.
Finally, static models, like a camera,
record snapshots at different stages
of time. In analyzing free trade policy
changes, they record the state of the
world before the trade policy is imple-
mented and after the economy has
adjusted to the new trade policy envi-
ronment. These models offer no esti-
mate of the length of time it takes to
get to the new long-run path. Dynamic
models provide this information.
A dynamic model is more like a video
camera in that it records the sequence
of events from the time the policy
change is enacted to the point where
the model settles down to its new
long-run position. Dynamic models
also allow one to build in anticipated
policy changes. For example, NAFTA
was discussed in the early 1990s, but
not implemented until 1994. Most
households and firms fully expected
NAFTA to come into effect from the
time the initial agreement was signed
in December 1992. With a dynamic
model, simulations can begin at some
specific point in time that may pre-
cede the implementation of a policy.
In addition to quantitative theoretical
models, researchers have made ad-
vances using time-series econometric
techniques to measure the impact of
liberalization policies such as NAFTA.
Time-series analysis differs significant-
ly from quantitative theoretical analy-
sis. Quantitative models are generally
fitted to data before the implementa-
tion of trade liberalization and then
simulated forward to formulate a
prediction about the likely impact
of the trade policy. Time-series tech-
niques try to measure the impact of the
trade liberalization from data after the
policy is implemented. The approaches
are not completely independent,
because time-series models need to
have some structure imposed in order
to draw inferences from the data.
Typically, economists draw on the
insights gained from quantitative theo-
retical models when imposing structure
on a time-series model. One drawback
associated with time-series analysis
is that measures of economic well-
being are theoretical constructs, which
means that measures of the gains from
liberalization can only come from a
fully specified quantitative trade
model, which time-series analysis
cannot provide.
For example, one measure of the
change in trade-associated well-being
that can be obtained from quantita-
tive trade models is a “compensating
variation.” In the context of NAFTA,
the compensating variation is that level
of consumption you would have to give
to the households in each country in
the pre-NAFTA environment to make
them indifferent to NAFTA. In other
words, the compensating variation
measures the amount of additional
consumption goods households would
have to have in the pre-NAFTA envi-
ronment to make them as well off as
under NAFTA.
Elsewhere, I have developed a dynamic
North-South trade model to assess the
gains from NAFTA.3 The simulations
begin at the date of the signing of the
initial NAFTA agreement (December
1992), a little over a year before the
implementation of NAFTA. My simula-
tion work takes NAFTA to be the joint
free-trade agreement between the U.S.
and Mexico, and Canada and Mexico,
so there is no U.S.–Canada liberaliza-
tion (because that was essentially
agreed to in the Canada–U.S. Free
Trade Agreement of 1989 [CFTA]).
Simulations of the dynamic model
suggest that the compensating varia-
tion, in terms of the percent change
in pre-NAFTA consumption, required
to leave households indifferent between
the pre-NAFTA environment and
NAFTA is 0.96% for Mexico, 0.12%
for the U.S., 0.01% for Canada, and
0.01% for countries outside North
America. Based on these results,
NAFTA leads to improvements in eco-
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In addition, simulations of my dynamic
model suggest that NAFTA leads to
an expansion of output, investment,
consumption, labor hours, and trade
in all three North American econo-
mies from the time it comes into
effect in January 1994. Mexico enjoys
the largest expansion within the region
(in percentage change terms). Un-
der NAFTA, Mexico’s level of gross
domestic product (GDP) is predicted
to rise by 3.26% by December 2009.
Underlying this increased output is
greater capital accumulation and in-
creased labor input. The expanded
output is also reflected in an increased
level of consumption of 2.52% and
double-digit increases in export and
import volumes. The model predicts
NAFTA will also lead to capital inflows
to Mexico. Over the simulation period
(December 1992 to December 2009),
Mexico’s ratio of net foreign assets to
GDP falls by 8 percentage points. Most
of the capital inflows are expected to
come from countries outside North
America. NAFTA has a smaller im-
pact on the U.S., with the level of U.S.
GDP rising by 0.24%. The level of ag-
gregate U.S. trade is predicted to rise
by about 1.5%. Trade with Mexico is
expected to rise by almost 20%. Given
the small volume of Mexican–Canadi-
an trade, it is not surprising that
NAFTA has a negligible impact on
the Canadian economy, with the level
of output expected to rise by 0.11%.
According to the model, NAFTA will
have a negligible impact on countries
outside North America.
Although there is a wealth of quanti-
tative research on NAFTA, outcomes
are not altogether comparable because
they generally consider very different
policy experiments and measures of
economic well-being. This makes pol-
icy evaluation extremely difficult for
groups like the USTR and USITC.
For example, my model’s calibration
draws on the parameters used in Ro-
land-Holst et al. (1992, 1994), which
makes their study a logical static
benchmark for my dynamic analysis.4
However, Roland-Holst et al. take a
somewhat broader view by allowing
NAFTA to include the CFTA. Brown
et al. (1992) define NAFTA in roughly
the same way as my dynamic analysis.5
Brown et al. offer a static analysis, in
which North America is fully modeled
as in my analysis, but they measure
economic well-being in a different
way, so comparisons between their
work and mine can only be made
for real economic activity.
Brown et al. find, as I do, that NAFTA
has a large impact on the Mexican
economy, but a negligible impact on
Canada, the U.S., and countries out-
side North America by the time the
agreement is fully implemented in
December 2009. Their static model
predicts that the level of Mexican
GDP will rise by 2.2% and that Cana-
dian and U.S. GDP will be 0.10%
higher following NAFTA. Overall, the
direction of change predicted by the
static and dynamic models following
NAFTA is the same. However, the
predicted impact is significantly
larger (roughly one and a half times
in the case of Mexico) in the dynam-
ic model. This is because the static
models limit the world capital stock
to its pre-NAFTA level and rule out
international capital flows. Greater
capital accumulation in the dynamic
model explains roughly two-thirds
of the change in the level of North-
American output. In particular,
Mexico’s GDP is predicted to rise by
roughly 3% of its pre-NAFTA level.
Changes in Mexico’s capital stock
alone explain roughly 2% of this
change, while increased labor effort
accounts for the remaining 1%.
Conclusion
The development of dynamic models
is the first step toward developing
a more realistic model of interna-
tional trade for trade policy analysis.
One of the inherent weaknesses of
the current variety of dynamic mod-
els is that they assume an exogenous
long-run growth rate. Future techno-
logical developments will be directed
at developing dynamic models that
allow for endogenous long-run
growth rates. Current dynamic mod-
els suggest that the gains from free-
trade agreements are significantly
larger than those of static models,
but they ignore growth effects asso-
ciated with trade liberalization. Chang-
es in the growth rate accumulate over
time. If endogenous growth models
find that trade liberalization has a
significant impact on growth rates,
then the gains from liberalization will
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(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
July Month ago Year ago
Cars 5.8 5.7 7.0




July Month ago Year ago
CFMMI 121.1 120.8 117.4
117.0 121.3 121.4 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Aug. Month ago Year ago
MW 60.5 58.7 63.0
56.2 64.4 62.4 U.S.
1995
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing
Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16 industries,
based on monthly hours worked and kilowatt hours.
IP represents the Federal Reserve Board’s Indus-
trial Production Index for the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Autos and light trucks are measured in an-
nualized units, using seasonal adjustments devel-
oped by the Board. The purchasing managers’
survey data for the Midwest are weighted averages
of the seasonally adjusted production components
from the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchas-
ing Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
The CFMMI increased 0.2% from June to July, following a 0.1% decline in June.
By comparison, the Federal Reserve Board’s IP increased by 0.1% in July and 0.3%
in June.  The machinery sector had the strongest performance in the Midwest
index, increasing by 1.3% in July. The steel sector recorded a 0.2% rise, following
a 1.4% decline in June, its first decline in seven months. The resource sector’s
output fell by 0.2%, its fourth straight monthly decline.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index increased to 60.5% in
August, its highest level since February 1995. The national purchasing managers’
composite index decreased from 64.4% in July to 62.4% in August, indicating
that activity in the manufacturing sector slowed from the previous month.
Motor vehicle production for July increased from 5.7 to 5.8 million units for
cars and decreased from 5.8 to 4.9 million units for light trucks.